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Just as King Midas had the ability to turn everything he touched into 
gold, the law can turn everything that it touches into law. This Midas-
inspired approach to jurisprudence offers a conceptually sophisticated 
account of legal positivism that should dissolve the debate between 
inclusive legal positivists and exclusive legal positivists. Yet, not 
everything that glitters is gold. Despite the explanatory achievements of 
the Midas approach, it misses crucial aspects about the nature of law. In 
particular, it overlooks law’s internal morality, which is identified in the 
work of American legal philosopher Lon Fuller and illustrated through 
Fuller’s cautionary tale of another king: Rex. Accordingly, my goal in this 
Article is twofold—to explore the strengths of the Midas approach to legal 


















 * Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, emanueltucsa@osgoode.yorku.ca. I would 
like to thank Rob Atkinson, Faisal Bhabha, Brian H. Bix, Trevor Farrow, Leslie Green, Allan C. 
Hutchinson, David Novak, Dan Priel, Kristen Rundle, Amy Salyzyn, N.E. Simmonds, and Alice 
Woolley for their comments and advice on this paper. I have benefitted greatly from their input. 















I. THE MIDAS TOUCH & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY......................................89 
 
A.  Standard Jurisprudential Metallurgy........................................89 
 
B.  Jurisprudential Alchemy............................................................92 
 
II. INSIDE THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CRUCIBLE........................................98 
 
A.  A Prerequisite for Jurisprudential Metallurgy..........................98 
 
B.  A Prerequisite for Jurisprudential Alchemy............................106 
 
C. Alloying the Midas Theory of Law..........................................110 
 
1. Melting the Metals.....................................................111 
 
2. Casting the Metals.....................................................113 
 



















I present to you a tale of two kings—Midas and Rex—one foolish and 
avaricious, the other ambitious but bungling, and both of whom benefit 
from correctives drawn from the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller. Famous 
from ancient Greek myth, Midas was granted the power to turn everything 
he touched into gold. His wish turned to his misery as his newfound ability 
proved to be the undoing of that which brought him happiness. Midas’s 
story has been developed by some legal philosophers into an analogy for a 
more strongly positivist and purely descriptive1 legal theory than leading 
positivist accounts.2 The Midas Theory of Law—which is based on the 
ability of law to turn what it touches into law3—can upset and enrich 
debates in legal philosophy by bringing forward descriptively powerful 
ideas about the relationships between disciplines and the concepts that 
disciplines share. On the other hand, Fuller told the allegory of Rex, a 
zealous reformer king who aspired to greatness as a lawmaker. Rex’s 
ambition turned into frustration as he failed to even make law, never mind 
reform it. Rex figured in Fuller’s writing as an illustration of how violating 
 
 
 1. See generally Andrei Marmor, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral, 
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 683 (2006). Marmor explains, “[L]egal positivism is best understood 
as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law . . . . By ‘descriptive’ I mean that such 
an account does not purport to justify or legitimize any aspect of its subject matter. By ‘morally 
neutral’, I mean that the theory need not take a stance on any particular moral or political issues, nor is 
it committed to any moral or political evaluations.” Id.  
 Kelsen uses a formulation that may be driving at the same ideas about positivism, 
descriptiveness, and moral neutrality. Newer formulations are preferable to Kelsen’s, however. Kelsen 
argues, “[T]he function of the science of law is not the evaluation of its subject but its value-free 
description. The legal scientist does not identify himself with any value, not even with the legal value 
he describes . . . .” HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 68 (Max Knight trans., 2d German ed., 
Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960). The second sentence in this quote, about the author not identifying 
himself with the legal value that he describes, sounds similar to Marmor’s statement about being 
“morally neutral,” meaning not taking a stance on moral or political issues in the subject matter being 
studied. That sentence is in line with what I mean by descriptive. Kelsen’s first sentence, however, is 
not possible, especially in the study of a normative field. See Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, § 4.3, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z6XV-3M3J] (arguing that description of law, a normative domain, cannot be 
“value-free,” also rejecting the “neutrality thesis”). 
 I thank Brian H. Bix for his suggestion that “non-prescriptive,” “conceptual,” or “analytic” may 
be better terms than “descriptive.” Marmor also admits some lack of clarity in these terms because 
“descriptive” is often contrasted with “normative,” though the two are “not necessarily opposed or 
mutually exclusive.” See Marmor, supra note 1, at 683–84. Having given the explanations in this 
footnote, I am satisfied that my use of the term “descriptive” can be sufficiently understood, and 
situated in the literature on legal philosophy, for the purposes of this Article.  
 2. Leading positivist accounts are those given by inclusive legal positivists and exclusive 
legal positivists, summarized below in Part I.A. These theories often give moral and political reasoning 
in support of their account of the independence of law from morality. 
 3. By creating legal conceptions of concepts that law shares with other domains of 
knowledge. 











law’s internal morality can lead to a failure to make law; he served as a 
contrast to Fuller’s account of lawmaking in accordance with the rule of 
law.  
In this Article, I will draw out the insights that the Midas Theory of 
Law can provide to the philosophy of law. Using Fuller’s work, I will also 
present a critique of the Midas Theory. In making my Fullerian critique, I 
propose a distinction between “substantive function” and “formal 
function.” The idea of substantive function assists in understanding the 
Midas Theory’s account of the separation between law and other domains 
of knowledge (including morality). Formal function explains the 
importance that Fuller’s internal morality of law has for the ontology of 
law. Though the Midas Theory provides a rich account of law’s 
substantive function, the theory cannot get off the ground without 
addressing Fuller’s arguments about law’s formal function. This Article 
should be taken as a largely favorable treatment of the Midas Theory 
bundled with a targeted and crucial criticism. The Midas Theory provides 
a sophisticated description of the ontological implications of the vast 
majority of interactions that law has with morality, addressing law’s 
substantive function. Fuller, however, furnishes a narrow but ontologically 
vital level of interaction between law and morality that the Midas Theory 
has not addressed. The internal morality of law takes ontological priority4 
before law’s Midas capacities. However, Fuller’s internal morality of law 
stops well short of nullifying the insightful analysis given by the Midas 
Theory. 
Part I introduces the topic and ideas on which this Article is based: 
explaining the debate in legal philosophy that the Midas Theory purports 
to dissolve (I.A); and providing a summary of the Midas Theory as it is 
applied in legal philosophy to explain the separation between law and 
other domains of knowledge (I.B). Part II contains a critique of the Midas 
Theory on the basis of Fuller’s procedural naturalism: explaining Fuller’s 
idea about the internal morality of law (II.A); using Fuller’s theory to 
critique the Midas Theory (II.B); continuing the critique and arguing that 
the two theories can be alloyed together (II.C); and describing the new 
alloyed theory (II.D). 
 
 
 4. In this Article, ontological priority is about dependence. If thing B has ontological 
dependence on thing A and thing A does not depend on thing B, then thing A has ontological priority 
over thing B. See Michael M. Gorman, Ontological Priority and John Duns Scotus, 43 THE PHIL. Q. 
460, 460 (1993). To say that the internal morality of law has ontological priority before law’s Midas 
capacities is to say that the Midas capacities depend on the internal morality of law and that the 












I. THE MIDAS TOUCH & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. Standard Jurisprudential Metallurgy 
The Midas Theory contributes a unique positivist vision to the broader 
debate between natural law theorists and legal positivists. This broader 
debate has centered on the relationship between law and morality, 
especially the question of whether the validity of law depends on law’s 
moral merits. In this Article, the term “validity,” as in “legal validity,” or 
“legally (in)valid,” refers to the ontological status of a “legal system” or 
particular “law.”5 Speaking of particular “laws,” Joseph Raz says, “A rule 
which is not legally valid is not a rule at all. A valid law is a law, an 
invalid law is not.”6 Focusing the usage of the term “validity” in this way 
raises the question of law’s ontological dependence on, or independence 
from, morality.  
Specifically, the question of legal validity in debates between some 
natural law theories and legal positivism is about whether law has essential 
ontological dependence on morality. Essential ontological dependence 
“involves requirements for identity or essence: an essentially dependent 
object is one which, as it were, would not be the object that it is had a 
condition of a certain sort not been met.”7 Essential dependence is 
contrasted with existential dependence, in which one thing depends on 
another in order to exist at all. Crucially, if law is essentially dependent on 
morality and a purported “legal system” or purported particular “law” fails 
to meet the essential requirements that morality sets, then the thing that 
was incorrectly purported to be law still exists, but that thing is not law. 
Speaking broadly, “Natural law theory is a mode of thinking 
systematically about the connections between the cosmic order, morality, 
and law.”8 Natural law theories suggest important and often necessary 
 
 
 5. Hereinafter, the terms “legal system,” “law,” and other relevant variants will be put in 
quotation marks when their membership in the ontological category of law is being discussed, 
especially in relation to rule of law requirements. 
 6. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 146 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 7. Fabrice Correia, Ontological Dependence, 3 PHIL. COMPASS 1013, 1014 (2008). 
 8. BRIAN H. BIX, Natural Law Theory, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 143 (2004). My 
thanks to David Novak for highlighting for me that some natural law theories have not given a central 
role to, or have even eschewed discussion of, the cosmic order and its relationship to law and morality. 
Somewhat arranged in order from authors who engage more with cosmic/religious questions to authors 
who are more secular in outlook, see generally SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (Richard 
J Regan trans., 2000); DAVID NOVAK, NATURAL LAW IN JUDAISM (1998); ANVER M. EMON, ISLAMIC 
NATURAL LAW THEORIES (2010); ANVER M. EMON, MATTHEW LEVERING & DAVID NOVAK, 
NATURAL LAW: A JEWISH, CHRISTIAN, AND MUSLIM TRIALOGUE (2014); Germain G. Grisez, The 
First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, 











connections between law and morality. With respect to law’s connections 
to morality (especially law’s necessary connections to morality), most 
natural law theories do not make the following specific claim: legal 
validity depends on law’s moral merits because law has essential 
ontological dependence on morality.9 Nevertheless, one theme that 
emerges in some natural law theories, including in this Article, is the 
argument that law’s validity depends on law’s moral merits because law’s 
ontological essence depends on morality (i.e., on law meeting certain 
moral conditions).10  
According to positivism, the validity of law does not depend (at least 
not necessarily) on law’s moral merits; law does not need (by necessity) to 
meet any moral standards to be valid.11 Law is ontologically independent 
of morality. In particular for this debate, law’s ontological essence does 
not require law to meet any moral conditions. Additionally, legal 
positivists argue amongst themselves about whether morality can be 
incorporated into legal systems, especially as conditions for the validity of 
law. An example of such incorporation would be a particular legal system 
bringing moral norms about fairness into its constitution. Inclusive legal 
positivists (or soft legal positivists) contend that morality can be 
incorporated into law by contingent choices made by legal institutions to 
adopt morality, e.g., moral norms about fairness, into positive law. 
Exclusive legal positivists (or hard legal positivists) reject the idea that 
morality can be incorporated into law.12  
Positivist descriptions of the interactions between law and morality 
(including the competing visions of inclusive positivism and exclusive 
positivism) are supported by different lines of argumentation. Most 
prominently, Joseph Raz claims that law provides an authoritative 
settlement of disputes, and guide for action, by replacing the differing 
substantive claims (the differing reasons for action) underlying those 
 
 
Article 2, 10 NAT. L.F. 168 (1965); Germain G. Grisez, Joseph Boyle & John Finnis, Practical 
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1987); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999); LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992). 
 9. Most of the authors in the previous footnote do not make the claim that legal validity 
depends on law’s moral merits because law has essential ontological dependence on morality. 
 10. See Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature of Law, § 1.1, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/ 
[https://perma.cc/M4YJ-NANB] (theories that do, and theories that do not, claim that law’s validity 
depends on its moral merits). The extent of this dependence is debated. 
 11. See BIX, supra note 8, at 120–21; Marmor & Sarch, supra note 10, at § 1.1. 
 12. See BIX, supra note 8, at 123; Ralf Poscher, The Hand of Midas: When Concepts Turn 
Legal, or Deflating the Hart-Dworkin Debate, in CONCEPTS IN LAW 99, 109 (Jaap C. Hage & Dietmar 












disputes (e.g., differing views about moral values/norms) with legal 
reasons for action (i.e. legal sources and judgments containing legal 
values/norms). Thus, rather than bringing differing viewpoints and 
arguments (about morality and other topics) into all practical interactions, 
people and institutions (public and private) can cite legal resolutions as the 
basis for their actions and for their expectations of others’ actions.13 This 
reasoning stands against theories that suggest that law’s own validity 
conditions can or must depend upon morality and against theories which 
say that law can incorporate moral content. Law cannot perform this 
authoritative replacement role if law must be consistent with the reasons 
for action (i.e., moral values/norms) that law was meant to replace.14 To 
the extent that they allow morality to become part of the validity 
conditions of law, inclusive positivism and natural law theory will be more 
awkward fits for the dispute resolution function explained by Raz than 
exclusive legal positivism is.  
Raz’s argument about law’s authority can be read descriptively and 
prescriptively. He describes law’s independence from morality as being 
based on law’s authority; the argument also provides politically and 
morally grounded prescriptions about when and how to act in a way that is 
guided by law’s authority.15 Law’s dispute resolution function is 
politically and morally valuable because the authoritative resolution helps 
individuals who have a plurality of viewpoints live peacefully and 
cooperatively with one another in the same society.16 While insightful, 
these prescriptive arguments in political and moral philosophy put 
positivist theory itself in the position of being entangled with morality, the 
very field from which positivists are seeking to ontologically disentangle 
legal validity. There is no contradiction in providing a moral or political 
argument in favor of the separation of a domain (in this case, law) from 
morality.17 Consider, however, a positivist viewpoint—the Midas 
Theory—that is not so entangled with politics and morality. 
 
 
 13. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 41–42 (1986). Therein, Raz gives his 
famous arbitrator example, explaining law’s dispute resolution function. 
 14. See id. at 42, 47–48. See generally id. at 57–62, for Raz’s discussion of pre-emption of 
authoritative reasons for action. 
 15. See id. at 63–66, where Raz explains that his account of authority is both conceptual and 
normative. 
 16. See id. at 58, 63–66. 
 17. Doing work that is more prescriptive in aim, some authors have given a greater role to 
morality in legal positivism by arguing that “the separation of law and morality…[is] a good thing, 
something to be sought for various political or moral reasons.” BIX, supra note 8, at 124. See generally 
TOM CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM (1996) (providing a moral case for 
positivism); Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1985) 
(also providing a moral case for positivism). 











B. Jurisprudential Alchemy 
Some legal theorists, including Hans Kelsen,18 adopted a particular 
positivist viewpoint called the Midas Theory of Law. The Midas Theory is 
explained well—and endorsed—in the work of the legal scholar Ralph 
Poscher.19 Poscher elucidates the sophisticated reason why these 
positivists believe that law can maintain its ontological separation from 
morality (keeping legal validity independent of law’s adherence to moral 
norms and knowledge) even as law interacts with morality. This reasoning 
is based in the Midas Theory’s understanding of law’s relationship to all 
other disciplines, not merely morality. 
Moreover, Poscher argues that the Midas Theory better explains law’s 
relationship with morality than either inclusive legal positivism or 
exclusive legal positivism do. Both inclusive legal positivism and 
exclusive legal positivism—the Midas Theory says—are based on a 
misunderstanding of the way in which domains of knowledge interact, and 
which the Midas Theory clarifies. The Midas Theory can thereby 
concurrently enrich traditional jurisprudential debates about law’s 
relationship with morality and provide an impetus to expand legal 
philosophy beyond the well-worn ground that focuses on law’s interaction 
with that single domain of knowledge. 
Explaining the way in which law deals with norms and knowledge 
from other domains, Poscher argues that law develops its own conceptions 
of concepts that it shares with other domains of knowledge. He describes 
the independence of legal conceptions as a “linguistic fact” that “has a 
deep and profound cause in the structure of the institutional and doctrinal 
practice of law, which develops methods, doctrinal standards, and 
institutions that set the parameters for legal conceptions.”20 Ontologically 
legal conceptions serve law’s institutional and doctrinal needs. Law’s 
substantive goals provide the impetus for law’s ontologically distinct 
conceptions. The processes of law provide the means by which legal 
institutions create and modify these distinct conceptions and give these 
conceptions legally normative force. Law’s ontological independence from 
other domains of knowledge is guaranteed by law’s freedom to develop its 
own goals, methods, and institutions apart from the conceptions of other 
 
 
 18. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 161 (Anders Wedberg trans., 
Russell & Russell 1961) (1945). 
 19. See Poscher, supra note 12. See also Danny Priel, Farewell to the Exclusive-Inclusive 
Debate, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 675 (2005). Priel proposes a similar take on law that resolves the 
exclusive positivist and inclusive positivist debate. 












disciplines. The nature of the relationships between disciplines 
themselves, rather than additional political and moral argumentation of the 
kind that some positivists give,21 allows law to both interact with other 
domains of knowledge and maintain its ontological independence from 
those domains. The theory that Poscher elaborates is more purely 
descriptive than any other positivist theory—not relying on, or offering, 
supporting arguments (especially prescriptive arguments) from political or 
moral philosophy. 
The Midas Theory says that when the law seems to adopt conceptions 
from other domains of knowledge, the law is actually creating a legal 
analogue, an ontologically legal conception of the shared concept that law 
has in common with that other field.22 Thus, law is neither incorporating 
aspects from another field23 (as in inclusive positivism), nor making use of 
those same aspects as they remain ontologically within another field (as in 
exclusive positivism). Even when it interacts with other domains of 
knowledge, law is creating its own materials that, through law’s Midas 
touch, are as aureate as other legal conceptions. Law’s conceptual wealth 
is ontologically independent from other domains of knowledge. This is 
true whether the law shares concepts with domains of knowledge in the 
humanities, the social sciences, the sciences, or morality.24 
To illustrate the way in which law’s Midas touch works, Poscher 
references law’s relationship with a branch of the atmospheric sciences: 
meteorology. Showing the way in which law shares a concept with 
 
 
 21. RAZ, supra note 13, and text accompanying notes 11-13. 
 22.  Poscher uses the terms “concepts” and “conceptions,” borrowing from W.B. Gallie, 
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1955–56). Poscher 
explains that he will use the terms in a way that is enriched by the extension/intension distinction. 
Poscher, supra note 12, at 100–02.  
 “The extension of an expression [or term] is the object or objects to which the expression 
applies [or refers]. For example, the extension of the noun ‘rose’ is the collection of all roses . . . . The 
intension of an expression [or term] is its meaning.” Harry Deutsch, Extension/Intension, in A 
COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS 254 (Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, & Gary S. Rosenkrantz eds., 2d ed. 
2009). Accord Extension/Intension, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1091 (Bob 
Hale, Crispin Wright, & Alexander Miller eds., 2d ed. 2017); David Braun, Extension, Intension, 
Character, and Beyond, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 9, 9 (Gillian 
Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012) (addressing “extension”); id at 12–13 (addressing “intension”).  
 Poscher explains that, under the extension/intension distinction: “One term can share a core of 
its extensions across different fields, while having slightly or even radically differing intensions. 
Owing to the common core of the extension, it is justified to consider such a term ranging across fields 
as referring to the same concept in the sense of the two-fold distinction between concepts and 
conceptions.” Poscher, supra note 12, at 101. He goes on to say: “I will speak of a shared concept, if a 
term [e.g., ‘fog’], employed in different areas of discourse [e.g., in law and meteorology], shares a core 
of extensions but might well have distinct intensions [when used in different contexts or fields]. The 
latter shall be referred to as distinct conceptions.” Id. 
 23. For example, moral values or norms and competing conceptions thereof. 
 24. See Poscher, supra note 12, at 100, 102–03. 











meteorology without being limited by meteorological conceptions, 
Poscher argues:  
If a road sign sets a special limit in case of fog, the development of 
the legal concept[ion] of fog might draw on a meteorological 
concept[ion] of fog, which describes and defines the notion by 
appeal to a certain ratio of humidity, temperature and barometric 
pressure. But it might also modify the meteorological concept[ion] 
by relying on a sight-factor, for the rationale for the special speed 
limit is the impairment of sight.25 
In Poscher’s example, law draws upon a concept that it shares with 
another field, and upon knowledge from that field, to inform a legal norm 
that sets traffic rules on a road. Law is not bound to take up the knowledge 
from meteorology without modification, but rather adapts the 
meteorological conception of the term “fog” into a legal conception that 
refers to the effect (reducing sight-factor) that fog26 has on the person who 
law seeks to regulate (i.e., a person driving in foggy conditions). 
Poscher elucidated that law keeps its conceptions independent from the 
conceptions of other fields by always having the prerogative to tailor its 
own conceptions to its own exigencies. This prerogative, he argues, also 
exists in the relationship between legal conceptions and moral 
conceptions.27 Poscher explains that there is nothing special to distinguish 
the way that law shares concepts with morality that would make for a 
necessary connection (or I would add ontological dependence) between 
legal and moral conceptions. There would also be no special relationship 
in which legal validity depends upon law’s adherence to moral 
conceptions. He argues that the only feature that is special in the 
relationship between law and morality is that the concepts that are the 
central focus of one field are also the focus of the other; both law and 
morality are greatly concerned with their own conceptions of shared 
concepts such as equality, freedom, and dignity.28 According to Poscher, 
however, the mere fact that these two fields are centrally concerned with 
the same concepts does not mean that the Midas Theory’s standard 
 
 
 25. Id. at 100. The word “concept” is modified to say “conception” here because 
“conception” better reflects the concept/conception distinction that Poscher makes, and uses 
repeatedly, just after this quote. See id. at 100–02. 
 26. Meaning the extension of the term “fog.”       
 27. Poscher, supra note 12, at 104–05, 108. 












separation between law and other domains of knowledge does not also 
exist between law and morality.29 
Like the example involving meteorology, Poscher grounds the 
independence of legal conceptions from moral conceptions in an 
understanding of the relationships between disciplines and the way in 
which these disciplines share concepts and knowledge contained in 
conceptions. Poscher explains: 
It is not a lack of objective moral truth or its epistemic status that 
account for the development of distinctly legal conceptions. Rather, 
that development is owing to the legal method and the doctrinal and 
institutional exigencies of law that are peculiar to it.  
In developing legal conceptions of liberty, equality, dignity and the 
like, the law can inform itself about similar conceptions in moral 
and political philosophy . . . . It does so just as it informs itself in a 
preliminary way about meteorology, medicine, and biology. 
Whatever insights such a consideration of conceptions in other areas 
of discourse might bring about, these insights will always have to be 
built into a specific legal conception that takes into account the 
specific legal history, methodology, forms of argumentation and 
institutional setting of law.30 
In Poscher’s view, responding to the natural law and inclusive 
positivist idea that morality is incorporated into the law through law’s use 
of moral concepts such as “fairness” requires rebutting a misapprehension 
that can arise from looking at two things that appear alike. These 
lookalikes are legal conceptions and moral conceptions, each of which 
originate from a common source: the yet unadulterated shared concept 
(e.g., fairness). Despite this common basis, the conceptions are 
ontologically independent and developed in accordance with the domains 
of knowledge to which the conceptions belong. According to the Midas 
 
 
 29. Id. Poscher also argues: “The difference between the relation of the law to moral 
philosophy on the one hand and other disciplines on the other is not structural but quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitatively many, though not all, legal questions have an equivalent in moral or 
political theory; qualitatively the two disciplines for one thing share some of their most important and 
crucial concepts, not only profane ones as in the case of meteorology; for another they are both 
normative disciplines.” Id. at 108–09. 
 Compare Leslie Green’s discussion of necessary connections between law and morality that do 
not undermine the idea that law can fail to meet moral standards but still be valid law. Green says that 
law necessarily: “regulates objects of morality,” “makes moral claims of its subjects,” “is justice-apt,” 
and “is morally risky.” Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1035, 1047–54 (2008). 
 30. Poscher, supra note 12, at 107.  











Theory, natural law theorists, Dworkinian interpretivists, inclusive 
positivists, and exclusive positivists have failed to fully appreciate that law 
and morality are ontologically distinct fields with their own conceptions 
that have shared terms and common unadulterated conceptual sources.  
When law and morality interact, the domains have two ontologically 
independent conceptions of a shared concept, not one concept existing in 
the moral domain with which law interacts. As Poscher puts it: 
[I]f law is like King Midas, then the entire debate [between 
Dworkinian interpretivism, inclusive legal positivism, and exclusive 
legal positivism] rests upon a common error and deflates. The law 
and morality only share common concepts but not common 
conceptions . . . . To draw on moral reasoning in the process neither 
leads to morality’s becoming part of the law, nor does it make the 
relation between the law and morality structurally unique by 
comparison with its relation to other disciplines. The law draws on 
moral conceptions as it draws on meteorology, medicine, or biology 
– without any need to trigger philosophically intense debates about 
the law being necessarily meteorological, or law having 
incorporated biology.31 
With this argument, Poscher closes an avenue that some natural law 
theorists would want for proving that there is a necessary connection 
between law and morality, and which would also be the basis of the debate 
between inclusive positivism and exclusive positivism. Although law is 
centrally concerned with value-laden terms such as justice, the law deals 
with such concepts not by reaching into morality and ontologically 
incorporating moral conceptions into law, but instead by creating 
conceptions that belong to the category of law. Since law develops its own 
conceptions of concepts that it shares with morality, law’s interaction with 
morality does not entail that law’s validity is tied to law’s moral merits. 
Poscher supports that view with an analogy to the relationship between 
 
 
 31. Id. at 111–12. My thanks to Robert Atkinson for raising the issue with me that law’s 
relationship with normative systems outside of law is different than law’s relationship with non-
normative domains. As Atkinson rightly observes, normative systems (such as morality) and their 
conceptions, might be law’s ends, whereas non-normative fields (such as meteorology), and their 
conceptions, might be law’s “means or materials.” These points can provide the grounding for a reply 
to Poscher’s Midas Theory that focuses more on substantive natural law thinking, as distinguished 
from the Fullerian procedural naturalism that is the focus of this Article. Atkinson’s point can be 
considered under law’s substantive function, discussed below in Part II.A. In line with Atkinson, one 
could argue that the Midas Theory does not apply equally to all extra-legal domains because some of 
those extra-legal domains are law’s substantive ends, as opposed to the “means or materials” that seem 
to be Poscher’s focus. It cannot be taken for granted that law’s Midas touch would be equally effective 












two other fields: architecture and religion. He says:  
The relationship between law and morality is structurally 
comparable to the relation between morality and other disciplines, 
such as architectural statics. Sacral buildings may become socially 
dysfunctional if they violate religious laws. A mosque not facing 
Mecca might not be accepted by a Muslim community, but it will 
not collapse. Structurally the functional relationship between the 
law and morality is not different from the relationship between 
architecture and religion.32 
Just as no amount of failure (caused by law’s dissonance with 
meteorology) to achieve law’s functional exigencies in the regulation of 
traffic will disqualify the positive law on driving from belonging to the 
category of law, no amount of failure (caused by law’s dissonance with 
morality) to achieve law’s functional exigencies in relation to moral 
problems will deny the positive law membership in the category of law. It 
is law’s ability to independently pursue its exigencies (i.e., to pursue these 
exigencies in a way that can deviate from the knowledge and prescriptions 
of other domains of knowledge) that guarantees law’s ontological 
independence. Law can learn from an external field but is always free to 
modify its own conceptions. 
Poscher’s Midas Theory emphasizes that law is an ontologically 
independent domain of knowledge that interacts with other domains of 
knowledge on deep levels. His theory does not take on more conceptual or 
metaphysical baggage than is required to explain law’s ontological 
independence during these interactions. The Midas Theory is as pure a 
descriptive effort as one can find in legal philosophy, especially in 
describing the relationship between law and morality. Poscher argues for a 
sharp fact/value distinction and does not make use of political or moral 
values or arguments33 to support what he thinks is ultimately a factual 
point. If everything that the law touches turns to law, and if this is also true 
when law touches morality, then the Midas Theory has a powerful 
response to the way in which natural law theorists, Dworkinian 
interpretivists, inclusive positivists, and exclusive positivists explain the 
relationship between law and morality. The Midas Theory dissolves the 
debates between some natural law theorists and the inclusive and 
exclusive varieties of legal positivism. 
The issue that arises, however, is that Poscher concludes, from his 
 
 
 32. Id. at 112. 
 33. For further explanation, see note 1 and accompanying text (stating this Article’s focus on 
the most descriptive positivist accounts). 











sophisticated reply to the theories just mentioned, that the relationship 
between law and morality “is structurally comparable to the relation 
between morality and other disciplines” and that, “[s]tructurally[,] the 
functional relationship between the law and morality is not different from 
the relationship between architecture and religion.”34 
II. INSIDE THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CRUCIBLE 
A. A Prerequisite for Jurisprudential Metallurgy 
Lon Fuller did not himself engage in the debate about relationships 
between domains of knowledge that is raised by the Midas Theory, but 
aspects of Fuller’s jurisprudence can be used to identify a major limitation 
in the Midas Theory. In his procedural naturalist theory of law, Fuller 
proposes that the rule of law (which he describes as an internal morality of 
law) provides a necessary connection between law and morality. The way 
in which Fuller establishes the connection between law and morality is 
based in the conditions upon which the ontological essence of law 
depends.  
As explained by Brian Leiter in his work on law and objectivity: 
The class of legal reasons can come to include moral reasons in two 
ways. First . . . sources of law—like statutes and constitutional 
provisions—may include moral concepts or considerations. The 
United States Constitution provides the most familiar examples, 
since it speaks of ‘equal protection,’ ‘liberty,’ and other inherently 
moral notions.35  
The legal theories that have been discussed so far in this Article are largely 
of this first kind, especially the debates between inclusive legal positivists, 
exclusive legal positivists, Dworkinian interpretivists, and natural law 
theorists who do not claim that legal validity depends on law’s moral 
merits.36 
The Midas Theory gives descriptive reasons for denying that this first 
way can happen at all. Law does not actually include moral concepts but 
instead performs law’s Midas touch. Poscher’s explanation of the 
interaction between law and other domains of knowledge shows the way 
in which law maintains its ontological independence from other domains 
 
 
 34. Poscher, supra note 12, at 112. 
 35. Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 969, 978 (Jules L. Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2002). 












(including morality), even as legal sources interact with norms and 
knowledge from other domains. Rather than “including,” or incorporating, 
concepts from other domains, the Midas Theory argues that law creates an 
ontologically legal conception of concepts that it shares with other 
domains. 
“Secondly,” Leiter argues, “moral reasons might be part of the class of 
legal reasons because they are part of the very criteria of legal validity.”37 
Leiter explains, “Satisfying the moral criteria might be necessary for a 
norm to be a legal norm, or it might be both necessary and sufficient. The 
strongest forms of natural law theory hold the latter.”38 In an effective and 
moderate way,39 Fuller’s theory of the internal morality of law holds out 
the rule of law as a necessary condition for being a legal norm. Stated 
briefly, there is a set of moral conditions that “legal systems” and 
particular “laws” must meet in order to perform the function of law. Since 
law’s essence involves the performance of this function, these moral 
conditions are also requirements for belonging to the ontological category 
of law.40 Being so foundational to the ontology of law allows Fuller’s 
procedural naturalism to gain an advantageous position on the Midas 
Theory of Law.41 
 
 
 37. Leiter, supra note 35, at 978. 
 38. Id.  
 39. The moderation becomes especially evident below in Part II.D. 
 40. Fuller addresses the essence of law in a way that is central to this Article, and that has 
largely been the focus of the scholarly attention given to this work, which has packaged Fuller’s theory 
in terms that are workable for a debate in jurisprudence that is concerned with legal validity. Kristen 
Rundle discusses the awkward fit that legal validity has in Fuller’s jurisprudence. She notes that the 
term “legal validity” has its inheritance in legal positivist jurisprudence and explores the extent to 
which legal validity occupied Fuller’s thinking and the place that legal validity takes in his work. See 
KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L FULLER 76–85 
(2012). Rundle is right to say that “Fuller’s writings are otherwise concerned with the much broader 
task of understanding law as a distinctive form, and with rejecting pathological instances of that form 
as rightly belonging within the meaning of law as a concept.” Id. at 79. I thank Rundle for her 
commentary on the present Article, in which she highlighted the extent to which I am packaging 
Fuller’s ideas for my purposes. I have indeed packaged Fuller’s work in a way that focuses on the 
language of legal validity, and which was not the focus of Fuller’s work. At the same time, Rundle has 
not suggested that discussion of Fuller’s commentary on legal validity is illegitimate or even a 
misreading of his work. Questions about legal validity deal with a slice of Fuller’s work, but the slice 
is important and doing a deep dive into it does not need to distort Fuller’s broader ideas. Compare with 
N.E. Simmonds, who cautions Rundle against too strongly reclaiming Fuller’s work from his debates 
with positivists like Hart, in which legal validity was the focus. Simmonds argues that this debate “is a 
battle where Fuller’s general strategy offers every prospect of victory,” and that seeking to move focus 
away from Fuller’s contribution to this debate “risks conceding important territory to those who have 
in reality failed to achieve the outright victory that is sometimes ascribed to them.” N.E. Simmonds, 
Freedom, Responsible Agency and Law, 5 JURIS. 75, 76 (2014) (reviewing RUNDLE, id.). Rundle and 
Simmonds are both astute here. The validity debate was not Fuller’s central focus, and yet Fuller has a 
vital insight to make about validity and law’s foundations.  
 41. Discussed in detail below in Part II.B.  











Fuller’s idea of the “internal morality of law”42 has two main steps: a 
functionalist thesis and a moral thesis.43 In legal philosophy, the first of 
these steps receives little contestation and the second is a minority 
position. The functionalist thesis posits that the rule of law is a necessary 
condition for the validity of law (or essence of law, in the terms used here) 
because the abidance of the rule of law is necessary for “legal systems,” 
and particular “laws,” to perform their functions as members of the 
ontological category of law. This function is guiding conduct. Described 
in broader terms, the function is subjecting human conduct to the guidance 
of rules. As Fuller quotes the words of Chief Justice Vaughan in the 1673 
King’s Bench case Thomas v. Sorrell, “[A] law which a man cannot obey, 
nor act according to it, is void and no law: and it is impossible to obey 
contradictions, or act according to them.”44 
Fuller provides eight desiderata that a purported “system of law,” and 
purported particular “laws,” cannot completely ignore and still belong to 
the category of law because failing in these conditions would be to fail to 
guide conduct.45 King Rex stupendously misses the mark of making law 
by failing, in eight concerted efforts at lawmaking, to meet each one of 
Fuller’s desiderata. The desiderata are: (1) Generality—laws should be 
general rules; (2) Promulgation—laws should be published; (3) 
Prospectivity—laws should be forward looking; (4) Clarity—laws should 
be clearly stated and understandable; (5) Consistency—laws should be 
 
 
 42. For a fuller development of this argument, see generally FULLER, supra note 8, at 4, and 
especially chapter 2. 
 43. For discussions of this two-step thesis, see N.E. SIMMONDS, LAW AS A MORAL IDEA 65, 
81 (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1135, 1139–44 (2008). See also Noam Gur, Form and Value in Law, 5 JURIS. 85, 88–90 
(2014) (reviewing RUNDLE, supra note 40). Gur additionally suggests a one-step reading that may be 
more favorable to Rundle’s reclamation of Fuller’s jurisprudence. Id. at 90–92. Kenneth Winston 
provides a six-step breakdown of Fuller’s internal morality of law (consistent with the two main steps 
outlined here). Winston’s breakdown highlights the central place of liberal political thought in Fuller’s 
work. See Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction to the First Edition of LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 25, 53 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., Hart Publishing 
2001) (1981). 
 44. FULLER, supra note 8, at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Sorrell (1673) 
124 Eng. Rep. 1098 (KB)). 
 45. See id. at 39. Beyond setting a minimal functional standard below which law cannot fall, 
Fuller recognizes that law can have the excellences of legality to greater or lesser degrees depending 
on its adherence to the morality of law. Thus, a “legal system” or particular “law” does not merely 
either qualify, or fail to qualify as law, in a binary fashion. Rather, the internal morality of law 
identifies a continuum of legality. See id. at 3–32, 41–44, 122–23. Fuller addresses the criticism that 
his theory makes it possible for the existence (or I would more accurately say essence, see Correia, 
supra note 7 and accompanying text) of a “legal system” to be a matter of degree, replying that “of 
course, both rules of law and legal systems can and do half exist.” Id. at 122–23. Accord Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 646 (1958) 












consistent with one another; (6) Possibility—laws should only prescribe 
behaviors that are possible; (7) Constancy—laws should be relatively 
stable, rather than subject to constant change; (8) Congruence—there 
should be consistency between the law as declared and as administered.46 
Fuller receives broad agreement on this first step of his procedural 
naturalism, including from inclusive legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart and 
exclusive legal positivists like Joseph Raz.47 
Fuller provides many of his own illustrations of how legislators 
(especially Rex) can fail to make law.48 The following example shows 
how a particular “law” could violate at least three desiderata.49 Consider 
the possibility of a secret “law,” about which the public, courts, and 
relevant parts of the executive branch are not informed,50 stipulating that, 
from the period of January 1, 2019 to March 1, 2019,51 it was a criminal 
offence for John Smith52 to produce more than a specified amount of milk 
on his farm. Although law is not merely the subjection of human conduct 
to rules, doing so is part of the essence of law. This example is not even a 
rule; it cannot possibly perform law’s function of guiding conduct. Thus, 
the example also fails to belong to the ontological category of law. 
Fuller’s theory applies to both “legal systems” and particular “laws.” 
Particular laws include statutes, case law, regulations, and possibly 
broader categories, such as particular customs in customary law. 
Conceptually, particular “laws,” just like “legal systems,” share in the 
function of the category of law: guiding human conduct using rules.53 If 
 
 
 46. FULLER, supra note 8, at 39. See generally id. at 46–91, where Fuller undertakes a 
detailed exposition of these desiderata. 
 47. See generally Waldron, supra note 43, at 1144–69 (explaining a number of examples in 
which Hart shows more openness to Fuller’s view, in particular Fuller’s functionalist analysis); JOSEPH 
RAZ, supra note 6, at 219–26. See also id. at 226, containing Raz’s example of a knife’s minimal 
functional ability to cut. Raz uses this argument to criticize Fuller’s moral thesis. Nevertheless, the 
soundness of the functionalist portion of Fuller’s argument is recognized (even if done 
unenthusiastically).   
 48. See generally FULLER, supra note 8, at 33–41 for illustrations using the example of Rex; 
id. at 46–91 for Fuller’s broader examples of challenges that arise in abiding by the desiderata. 
 49. In addition to the three desiderata mentioned in this paragraph, this example “law” likely 
violates Fuller’s sixth desideratum, requiring that law be possible to obey. Timothy Stostad argues that 
Fuller’s desiderata can be subsumed under the sixth desideratum of possibility because the desiderata 
are grounded in the idea of obeyability. This means that all failures to abide by the internal morality of 
law are necessarily failures of possibility. See Timothy Stostad, An Unobeyable Law is Not a Law: Lon 
Fuller’s “Desiderata” Reconsidered, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 365 (2015). 
 50. The “law” is not promulgated. 
 51. The “law” is not prospective. These dates have elapsed before the publishing of this 
Article. 
 52. The “law” lacks generality. 
 53. Further clarification can be given here about the meaning of “particular laws.” One 
meaning of “particular laws” might be collections of rules in specific documents, such as statutes, 
court decisions, or regulatory documents. More granularly, another meaning of “particular laws” might 











the function of guiding conduct is shared at the level of “legal systems” 
and the level of particular “laws,” then it can be asked whether all of 
Fuller’s eight desiderata are applicable to particular “laws,” and to what 
extent, or whether some conditions (though applicable to “legal systems”) 
might not affect the ability of particular “laws” to guide conduct. 
Determining these questions about each desideratum requires an 
examination of the relevance of each of Fuller’s desiderata to the function 
of particular “laws.” 
The need for particular “laws” to abide by the desiderata of the rule of 
law in order to guide conduct is even more readily understood than it is for 
“legal systems” as wholes. Fuller’s desiderata are applied to particular 
“laws,” which can have, or fail to have, all the distinctively legal 
excellences that Fuller identifies in his eight desiderata. It is particular 
“laws,” not “legal systems,” that would fail to be promulgated or that 
would be retroactive, for example. When such defects are widespread 
enough in a purported “legal system,” the result is that the system does not 
qualify as a legal system because the system does not subject human 
conduct to the guidance of rules. Fuller’s desiderata are all necessary for 
particular “laws” to guide conduct.  
As it is for “legal systems,” a complete failure to abide by Fuller’s 
desiderata would result in the failure of particular “laws” to perform their 
function. A particular “law” that: (1) is directed at only one person; (2) is 
not promulgated; (3) governs only past behavior; (4) is not clear; (5) is 
inconsistent with another particular “law” (if the inconsistent elements of 
both “laws” are intended to stay in force) or has provisions that are 
inconsistent with one another; (6) requires people to perform impossible 
actions; (7) is constantly changing; and (8) is not administered in a way 
that is congruent with the way that the law is declared, cannot guide 
conduct. This is a complete failure to perform law’s function, a failure 
relating to the first step of Fuller’s two-step argument. Thus, Fuller’s 
desiderata are applicable to particular “laws,” meaning that particular 
“laws” cannot completely disregard the desiderata and still belong to the 
ontological category of law. 
The failure to perform law’s function—subjecting human conduct to 
the guidance of rules—by failing to abide by the rule of law is almost 
always more immediately ontologically consequential for particular 
“laws” than for “legal systems.” The complete failure of a particular “law” 
to meet the desiderata means that the purported particular “law” is not a 
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rule. A single logical inconsistency in a key part of a statute might result in 
the failure of that particular “law” to guide human conduct. By contrast, a 
“legal system” can more easily survive a logical inconsistency in a 
particular “law,” or between particular “laws,” contained within the “legal 
system”—other than perhaps in a rule of recognition or other “law” of 
foundational significance.54 The same can be true for a failure to 
promulgate a particular “law” or failure to make a particular “law” 
prospective. Such flaws can invalidate an entire particular “law” while the 
system as a whole will less frequently lose so much of the essence of law 
that it fails to be a legal system. 
The present point is not that particular “laws” do not allow for degrees 
of variance from the rule of law before the particular “laws” lose so much 
of the essence of law that they are legally invalid. As noted by Fuller, the 
creation of case law does not adhere perfectly to the desideratum of 
prospectivity because developments in case law have an element of 
retroactivity for the parties whose case is being decided.55 This departure 
from perfect adherence to the desideratum of prospectivity does not mean 
that case law cannot belong to the ontological category of law. Indeed, 
retroactivity for the parties whose case is being heard is the normal way in 
which case law is developed. The key to the present point is that “legal 
systems,” as wholes, can tolerate more widespread and varied departures 
from perfect adherence to the desiderata than a particular “law” can. Given 
that “legal systems” and particular “laws” share the basic functional 
requirements contained in the rule of law and that particular “laws” have 
even less room for variance from the desiderata than the “legal system,” 
there is no conceptual reason to apply Fuller’s theory only to “legal 
systems” and not also to particular “laws.” 
Going beyond the question of whether law’s internal morality can 
apply to particular “laws,” rather than merely to “legal systems,” Fuller 
himself both applies his theory to particular “laws” and argues about 
“legal systems” in a way that allows for some “laws” to be invalid due to 
their failure to abide by the rule of law while other “laws” remain valid. 
This can be seen both in his broad discussion of his theory56 and in his 
application of his jurisprudence to actual cases, including law in Nazi 
 
 
 54. See generally FULLER, supra note 8, at 66–70, for Fuller’s discussion of the ways in 
which “legal systems” handle contradictions and apparent contradictions in particular “laws.”      
 55. See generally id. at 55–58, for Fuller’s discussion of retroactivity in case law. 
 56. See, e.g., supra note 45 and accompanying text. 











Germany.57 As argued by Kristen Rundle, Fuller’s analysis, which 
recognizes continuums and degrees of legal validity, can conclude that 
some “laws” within a “legal system” may be valid while others are not. 
Rundle explores Fuller’s discussion of the Nazi “legal system,” which was 
a central case to which Fuller applied his jurisprudential theory. She points 
out that Fuller’s discussion of the Grudge Informer cases were “focused on 
the text and mode of administration of particular Nazi laws, rather than 
any broad commentary on the system as a whole (even if the laws in 
question were typical of the kind generated by that system).”58 Rundle 
notes that, rather than always discussing the validity of the Nazi “legal 
system” as a whole, Fuller applies his critique of the validity of law in 
Nazi Germany to specific parts of the “law” in Germany, namely public 
“law,” and not to private “law,” “at least for those who were not the target 
of Nazi persecution.”59 
As specific examples of areas of private “law” that would not have run 
afoul of Fuller’s account of the rule of law, Rundle says that, “It is thus 
unlikely . . . that Fuller would have denied the title of law to legal 
transactions between Aryan Germans concerning wills and estates, or the 
buying and selling of property, because the structure of such legal 
relations was rarely affected by the institutional transformations of the 
Nazi ideological program.”60 Fuller’s application of his theory, including 
in relation to Nazi “law,” “depends on the particular law, and the 
intelligibility of the particular legal relationship, in question.”61 Crucially, 
to evaluate the legal validity of particular “laws” is not to turn away from 
thinking about the validity of “legal systems.” The starting point of 
Fuller’s discussion of validity is the “formal health” of the “legal system,” 
which “remains in the background, even when Fuller is evaluating the 
characteristics of a particular law.”62 
The second aspect of Fuller’s procedural naturalism, his moral thesis, 
posits that the rule of law, and Fuller’s eight desiderata, are also moral 
conditions for the validity of law. The desiderata themselves implicitly 
 
 
 57. In the following discussion of Fuller’s application of his theory of the internal morality of 
law, making it clear that the theory applies to particular “laws,” I will focus on Fuller’s appraisal of the 
validity of Nazi law. Fuller’s application of his theory to particular “laws” can also be seen throughout 
FULLER, supra note 8, at 46–91. 
 58. RUNDLE, supra note 40, at 80. See generally David Dyzenhaus, The Grudge Informer 
Case Revisited, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000 (2008), for a detailed look into the Grudge Informer case that 
motivated debate between Fuller and Hart. 
 59. RUNDLE, supra note 40, at 80. 
 60. Kristen Rundle, The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust, 
59 U. TORONTO L.J. 65, 84 (2009). 
 61. RUNDLE, supra note 40, at 80 (referencing Rundle, supra note 60, at 84). 












recognize individual autonomy and set a baseline of respect for individual 
autonomy as a necessary condition for the validity (or essence) of law. As 
Fuller says while discussing the account of humanity that is implied in the 
internal morality of law, “To embark on the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a 
commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, 
capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his 
default.”63 Fuller describes law’s commitment to a view of human nature 
that recognizes people’s autonomy as “the most important respect in 
which an observance of the demands of legal morality can serve the 
broader aims of human life generally.”64 
Violations of Fuller’s desiderata fall below this baseline of respect for 
individual autonomy. Fuller goes as far as saying that “[e]very departure 
from the principles of law’s inner morality is an affront to man’s dignity as 
a responsible agent.”65 Raising specific examples of departures from the 
rule of law, Fuller argues that, “To judge [a person’s] actions by 
unpublished or retrospective laws, or to order him to do an act that is 
impossible, is to convey to him your indifference to his powers of self-
determination.”66 This wrong can be especially egregious in the case of 
criminal law, where one can raise examples such as a citizen being 
required by a “law” to perform an impossible task and potentially being 
imprisoned for failing to perform the task. This example would result in a 
loss of liberty (through imprisonment) on the basis of a “law” that failed to 
respect the person’s autonomy in the first place. 
Not every aspect of morality creates a validity condition for law based 
in the internal morality of law. Fuller recognizes this as he says, “I have 
repeatedly observed that legal morality can be said to be neutral over a 
wide range of ethical issues.”67 His desiderata are specifically relevant to 
law’s function of guiding human conduct.68 A “legal system,” or a “law,” 
that violates substantive morality—but that does not undermine the 
conduct-guiding function of law (“non-ROL morality”)69—can be 
 
 
 63.  FULLER, supra note 8, at 162. 
 64.  Id. 
 65. Id. Fuller’s statement could be made more modestly. He has recognized that some 
departures from the internal morality of law might be acceptable and might even be unavoidable, such 
as the creation of case law. See FULLER, supra note 55, and accompanying text. 
 66.  FULLER, supra note 8, at 162. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See id. at 106, where Fuller gives his well-known statement that “law is the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.” 
 69.  I have avoided using the term “external morality” here because Fuller has his own 
specialized use for this term. See generally RUNDLE, supra note 40, at 63–65. Non-ROL morality is 
meant in this Article to encompass all of morality that is not a formal condition for the validity of law. 











critiqued on moral grounds. However, such violations would not result in a 
failure to perform law’s conduct-guiding function. For example, a “law” 
that has the purpose or effect of segregating neighborhoods racially, while 
subject to rebuke on non-ROL moral and political grounds, as well as 
possibly other grounds in the positive law that may be inspired by the 
substance of moral conceptions, does not fail to perform the conduct-
guiding function of law as long as the “law” is consistent with Fuller’s 
eight desiderata. Such a “law” would not raise the specific concerns about 
legal validity that come from the rule of law. Thus, Fuller’s view identifies 
a limited set of moral norms as internal functional conditions for the 
essence of law.70 
The pushback that Fuller receives on his moral thesis concerns whether 
his desiderata are truly moral conditions or simply functional conditions.71 
Entering that debate over Fuller’s moral thesis would take this Article far 
afield. The purpose of discussing Fuller’s functionalist thesis here is to 
identify a weak point in the Midas Theory. The weak point relates to 
Poscher’s strong descriptive view of the degree of independence that law, 
or any field of knowledge, can have from other fields of knowledge. 
Identifying this vulnerability does not depend on Fuller’s moral thesis; the 
functionalist step in Fuller’s theory is what opens a vulnerability in the 
Midas Theory to this Article’s critique. It is the full articulation of a 
Fullerian critique of Pocher’s weak point that requires a deeper discussion 
of Fuller’s moral thesis. The latter of those two projects is a bigger task 
than can be undertaken here. Accordingly, the remainder of this Article 
will focus on functional analysis, rather than on analysis of Fuller’s moral 
thesis about the rule of law. 
B. A Prerequisite for Jurisprudential Alchemy 
Part I.B described Poscher’s idea that, because of law’s Midas touch, 
the relationship structure between law and other domains of knowledge is 
 
 
 70.  Suggesting the reverse of the narrowly defined influence of law’s internal morality on the 
overall moral goodness or badness of law, Fuller is perhaps overconfident about the extent to which 
“legal systems” that abide by the rule of law will be consistent with non-ROL morality. See FULLER, 
supra note 8, at 153–55; Fuller, Positivism & Fidelity, supra note 45, at 636–38. See also Stostad, 
supra note 49, at 384–85, discussing Fuller’s claims about the rule of law and broader moral concerns. 
Even here, though, Fuller is at most overstating the effects of law’s formal functional conditions. The 
conditions themselves remain narrowly focused on formal function, even as the effect of obeying the 
conditions is said to be broader. 
 71.  See RAZ, supra note 6 (sharp knife example, discussed supra note 47 and accompanying 
text); H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (reviewing FULLER, supra note 8). 
See generally Waldron, supra note 43, for Waldron’s discussion of the range of responses that Hart 












such that law does not become ontologically dependent on those domains 
when it interacts with those domains. According to this theory, law’s 
relationship to morality is structurally no different from law’s relationship 
to any other domain. While Poscher’s explanation provides significant 
insights about law’s relationships with other domains, the argument misses 
that the ontological structure of the relationship between law and morality 
is fundamentally different from law’s relationships to other fields. Law has 
essential ontological dependence72 on morality because of the internal 
morality of law. Fuller explains how lawmakers must act in accordance 
with the rule of law to be able to create law. Midas’s royal prerogatives in 
this respect are no greater than Rex’s are. The rule of law ontologically 
precedes law’s Midas function of creating legal conceptions of shared 
concepts.73 Thus, even lawmaking done in the name of law’s Midas 
function must be done in abidance of the internal morality of law.  
Specifically addressing the central insights of Poscher’s articulation of 
the Midas Theory, I argue that although law may be free to tailor its own 
conceptions to its own exigencies (and is not bound to accept the 
conceptions of another field of knowledge), the process of tailoring legal 
conceptions to meet the exigencies of law happens under the auspices of 
the rule of law. Exercising law’s Midas touch to pursue ontologically legal 
exigencies cannot happen if there is no law to guide conduct. The gilding 
work of creating ontologically legal conceptions of shared concepts 
happens within “legal systems” and particular “laws” that are 
ontologically legal. These legal containers (valid “legal systems” and valid 
particular “laws”)74 must themselves be functionally compliant with the 
ontology of law (i.e., must abide by the rule of law, which sets 
requirements for law’s function of guiding human conduct). 
Moreover, the conceptions found within “legal containers” (i.e. 
purported “legal conceptions”) must also meet the conditions that the rule 
of law sets for law’s ontological essence. Law may attempt to create a 
legal conception of a shared concept as law pursues its own exigencies 
when interacting with other domains of knowledge. However, if the “legal 
 
 
 72. See generally Correia, supra note 7. 
 73. The foundational importance of the internal morality of law gives it priority over the 
philosophical issues addressed by the Midas Theory. Also appreciating the foundational importance of 
Fuller’s theory, Kristen Rundle has argued separately that Raz’s theory of the authority of law 
presupposes that law has a formal structure that recognizes the agency of the legal subject who adheres 
to law’s authority. See Kristen Rundle, Form and Agency in Raz’s Legal Positivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 
767 (2013). My thanks to her for drawing my attention to this piece. 
 74.  One should not mistakenly conclude from the foregoing that legal systems and particular 
laws are merely containers for conceptions. I am simply describing them as containers for this specific 
point about the ontology of legal conceptions. 











conception” itself fails to meet the conditions of the rule of law, thereby 
losing the essence of law because it fails to guide conduct, then the 
conception does not belong to the ontological category of law and may be 
a conception of a different ontological kind.75 The ontological 
classification of the “legal containers” and the “legal conception” depends 
upon the satisfaction of the rule of law, a necessary functional condition 
for membership in the ontological category of law. A failure at any of 
these levels—i.e., a failure by the “legal system,” particular “law,” or 
“legal conception” to meet the conditions for the ontological essence of 
law—interrupts the Midas touch through which law would alchemize non-
law.  
This is an issue that exists at a more basic level than Poscher discusses 
as he explains the way in which law gains informational/epistemic and 
functional benefits from taking aboard conceptions from other fields of 
knowledge. To illuminate this difference, this Article distinguishes 
between “substantive function” and “formal function.” Substantive 
function refers to the achievement of the substantive aims of a system (a 
legal system in this Article), or of the elements of a system (laws and 
conceptions in this Article). The substantive functions of a legal system 
might be contained in a legal system’s constitution or pervade legislation 
and case law. Substantive functions (i.e., a legal system’s substantive 
aims) might be limited only by the imaginations of lawmakers and real-
world possibilities. Formal function refers to the ability of a thing to 
perform its own function (to function as the ontological thing that it is) or, 
taken down a level, for the elements of a system to function as the things 
that they are (i.e., parts of a specific ontological type of functioning 
system). In the case of law’s formal function, this Article refers both to the 
ability of a system to function as a legal system and to the way in which 
particular “laws” must function in order to contribute to the ability of a 
system to function as a legal system.76 
 
 
 75.  There may be instances in which a “legal system” can fail to even create a valid 
conception of any ontological kind. The specific desiderata of clarity and consistency could be 
necessary conditions for being a conception and may be a necessary condition for any sort of 
prescriptive conception. 
 76.  My response to the Midas Theory proceeds on the basis of law’s dependence on the rule 
of law. I use only the formal Fullerian conception of the rule of law, explained above in Part II.A. One 
could add complexity to the considerations that I am raising about the Midas Theory in light of the rule 
of law (including types of function and ontological dependence) by discussing different accounts of 
the rule of law. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept 
(In Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002), which contains Waldron’s discussion of the contestation 
over conceptions of the rule of law and rule of law as an essentially contested concept. Waldron cites 
Gallie, supra note 22. On a related note, my thanks to Dan Priel for raising the possibility of applying 
the Midas Theory to the values (i.e., respect for individual autonomy) that underlie the formal 












When discussing the substantive and formal functions of systems or 
elements in different ontological categories, a distinction can be made 
between types of dependence on, and independence from, systems or 
elements of another category. The substantive functions of systems or 
elements in one category may be dependent on, or independent of, their 
abidance by systems or elements of another category. Similarly, the formal 
functions of systems or elements in one category may be dependent on, or 
independent of, their abidance by the systems or elements of another 
category. Crucially, the definition of formal function given herein means 
that anything (especially any discipline, for present purposes) that has 
formal functional dependence on another thing has its functional 
dependence built into its essence. It has essential ontological dependence 
on the other thing (on the other domain). It would cease to be the thing 
that it is if it did not perform certain formal functions. Poscher, explaining 
the example of laws that regulate driving in fog (thereby seeking to 
improve road safety), raises questions related to substantive functional 
dependence on, and independence from, another domain of knowledge 
(i.e., law’s substantive functional dependence on meteorology). The 
definition of substantive function given in this Article does not necessarily 
make substantive function the dependee in essential or existential 
ontological dependence relationships. Rather, Fuller’s thesis about the 
internal morality of law raises questions about formal functional 
dependence and independence (i.e., law’s formal functional dependence 
on morality via the rule of law). Fuller’s theory thus pertains to essential 
ontological dependence/independence.  
Substantive functions and formal functions are separate capacities that 
may not always accompany one another. Systems or elements may fail to 
achieve their substantive function while achieving their formal function. 
An example of a failure in substantive function accompanied by a success 
in formal function might be found in some legal regulatory regimes, like 
government price controls that seek to make a certain good more 
affordable. Such strategies could fail to achieve their aims (not keeping the 
 
 
Such a possibility might allow the Midas Theory to define a conception of the rule of law (which I 
have used to critique the Midas Theory). These complications, developed from the debates raised by 
Waldron and posed to me by Priel, depend on questions related to when, or even if, law’s adoption of a 
conception can affect the underlying extensions of terms. See supra note 22, defining extension, 
intension, concept, and conception. I am largely favorable to the claims that the Midas Theory makes 
about law’s freedoms to develop its own intensions in the legal realm. Moreover, law may be able to 
affect extensions by adopting its own intensions in the legal realm. Such possibilities require 
argumentation that falls beyond the scope of this Article. However, I am doubtful that law can affect 
extensions that are the ontological conditions of law’s own essence; such powers would be something 
of a bootstrapping Midas touch. 











price of goods below a certain ceiling) or could result in unintentional 
adverse effects (e.g., shortages or even price increases by distorting the 
signals and incentives given to producers and consumers).77 In these cases, 
such “laws” fail to achieve their substantive goals in that they fail to make 
the product more affordable. However, the “laws” do not fail to belong to 
the category of law or fail to attempt to achieve their substantive goal by 
functioning as law. 
Dealing with the same fact scenario, examples of failure to achieve 
formal function would involve extensive departures from the rule of law in 
attempting to create “laws” that try to keep prices down. Akin to the 
efforts of King Rex,78 such departures might include: creating a vague rule 
that prices should not be “too high” (lacking clarity), retroactively creating 
a rule that imposes a penalty for having produced less of a good, during a 
time in the past, than is needed for a new supply management or quota 
system (lacking prospectivity), or creating a rule that names the companies 
in an industry and prohibits them from setting prices for the good above a 
certain level (lacking generality). Economists might be able to furnish 
more economically savvy examples of ways in which regimes that fail at 
the formal function of law might attempt to achieve economic goals.79  
My present purpose is to highlight the point that there is a difference 
between pursuing a certain substantive goal by way of functioning as law 
and pursing a substantive goal by other means—i.e., by the creation of 
something that belongs to a category other than law. There may be other 
forms of social organization besides law that can be used (effectively or 
ineffectively) to pursue desired substantive goals. The conditions of 
formal function set by the rule of law for the ontological essence of law 
 
 
 77.  There are other aspects of price controls (complicating factors) that are not relevant to 
this Article, but the general dynamics that I have outlined are well known in economics and serve well 
to illustrate a possible failure of substantive function while formal function is achieved. For 
explanations and illustrations of this economic phenomenon, see generally David Schmidtz, Are Price 
Controls Fair?, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2015); Anindya Sen, Anthony Clemente & Linda 
Jonker, Retail Gasoline Price Ceilings and Regulatory Capture: Evidence from Canada, 13 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 532 (2011); Christopher R. Knittell & Victor Stango, Price Ceilings as Focal Points for 
Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1703 (2003). 
 78.  It will also be interesting to examine the functional role that human actors play in the 
formal function and substantive function of a system. This calls for a deeper philosophical analysis of 
the roles of lawyers, judges, juries, etc.  
 79.  Substantive knowledge about the phenomena that law attempts to regulate may indicate 
that failures of formal function could also imply a failure of substantive function. In the current 
example, an economist may be able to inform a lawmaker that the types of failures of formal function 
just described would imply a failure to achieve the substantive economic goals. Crucially, for the 
purpose of the current discussion about the ontological relationship between domains of knowledge, 
considering such relationships requires additional information beyond the mere fact that the form of 












determine whether an effort at social organization belongs to the 
ontological category of law or to another ontological category. 
C. Alloying the Midas Theory of Law 
Much like a metallurgist can take a metal that is insufficiently strong 
for its purpose and make it stronger by alloying it with another metal, so 
too I will strengthen the Midas Theory by adjusting it to my Fullerian 
critique. Rather than refuting or dissolving the Midas Theory, Fullerian 
legal theory—due to its carefully identified elements—can blend with a 
wide range of natural law and positivist legal theories, including the Midas 
Theory. This section explores the way in which the Fullerian arguments 
introduced thus far in Part II can be combined with the Midas Theory to 
achieve a better explanation of the relationships between domains of 
knowledge. The internal morality of law is a necessary condition for the 
performance of law’s formal function, for law’s interaction with other 
domains of knowledge, and even for law’s pursuit of its substantive 
function80 in accordance with the Midas Theory. 
1. Melting the Metals 
Having the distinction between types of function (substantive vs. 
formal), and their respective types of dependence, sheds light on 
arguments that Poscher uses to support the Midas Theory and on the 
Fullerian critiques brought forward in this Article. This distinction 
between types of functions and types of dependence/independence can be 
even more deeply understood through the re-examination of one of the 
analogies that Poscher uses to support his position. Recall that, in arguing 
for the independence of domains of knowledge, Poscher analogizes the 
relationship between law and morality to the relationship between 
architecture and religion in the construction of a mosque.81 Poscher’s use 
of this analogy illustrates some aspects of substantive functional 
relationships between domains of knowledge but elides crucial nuances 
about the ways in which some domains of knowledge can relate to one 
another. His account misses out on formal functional relationships and the 
essential ontological dependence that can exist therein.  
 
 
 80.  That is, the pursuit, by the ontological category of law, of its substantive function. 
 81.  Fuller himself also analogized law and architecture. He gave this analogy in pieces that 
were part of his unfinished work on law and social theory. See generally FULLER, supra note 43, at 
61–78 (law under the broader topic of “social architecture”), 285-291 (lawyers as “architects of social 
structure”). 











In his architecture example, Poscher rightly argues that even if a 
building cannot serve what I have described as substantive functions (in 
this case, the religious purposes for which it was built), the building can 
achieve what I have described as formal functions (in this case, the formal 
functions of the domain of architecture). If the design of the building 
merely does not meet religious requirements for the building’s usage, that 
building may be socially/religiously/substantively dysfunctional, and the 
intended users of the building may refuse to perform their religious 
services in it. However, such a building can still stand and otherwise 
achieve the formal aims that architecture has for structures. The building 
will still be fit for occupation and usage outside of the religious context 
because the building can still perform the formal architectural function of 
a building. To work with one historically influential theory of architecture, 
the building can still fulfill aspects of the Vitruvian Triad: being durable 
(the key formal functional standard), being useful (generally fit as an 
architectural product for various substantive functional uses that people 
have for buildings), and having architectural beauty.82 Moreover, the 
architect who designs this building still engages in an activity that belongs 
to the domain of architecture and fulfills formal functional aims of the 
domain of architecture.83 
Though there is substantive functional dependence between 
architecture and religion when religious buildings are designed, neither 
religion nor architecture depend on the other domain to perform their 
respective formal function(s); the domains do not have formal functional 
dependence on one another. In Poscher’s example of a religious building 
that does not meet religious requirements—such as not being properly 
oriented towards Mecca—the building fails to perform a religious 
 
 
 82.  See generally Saul Fisher, Philosophy and the Tradition of Architectural Theory, 
Supplement to Philosophy of Architecture, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/architecture/tradition.html [https://perma.cc/294P-SRAU]; HANNO-
WALTER KRUFT, A HISTORY OF ARCHITECTURAL THEORY: FROM VITRUVIUS TO THE PRESENT 24–25 
(Ronald Taylor, Elsie Callander, & Antony Wood trans., Princeton Architectural Press 1994) (1985); 
Mark Wilson Jones, Greek and Roman Architectural Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GREEK 
& ROMAN ART & ARCHITECTURE 41, 45–46 (Clemente Marconi ed., 2015). 
 83.  In the reverse direction, religious practitioners who build no structures, who do not mix 
religion and architecture through designs and elements such as the cruciform church or the mihrab (a 
niche in mosques indicating the direction of Mecca), can still do things such as address questions about 
the divine, the big questions of life, and the meaning of life, as well as pursue other aims of particular 
religions, or aims that are shared across religions. A religious practitioner who does not concern 
himself/herself with structures has still engaged in activities that belong to the domain of religion and 
that fulfill formal functional aims of the domain of religion. Practitioners of both the domains of 
architecture and religion can do things in a way that falls within their domain without satisfying the 
other domain. This illustrates, from a different direction, Poscher’s point about the separation of fields 












substantive function (the building is not fit for a religious purpose). 
However, the building can function as an architectural product since the 
failure of substantive function does not mean that the building fails to 
perform its architectural formal function. The substantive function of 
architecture applied to religious buildings relies upon the creation of an 
architectural design that is in coherence with religious norms, but the 
formal function of architecture does not depend on the design’s abidance 
of religious norms. Architecture’s formal function is defined by standards 
that classify products and practices within the domain of architecture—i.e., 
the essential ontological standards of architecture. The substantive 
religious function of a building is not such a standard for architecture. 
With respect to the parts of morality on which law has substantive 
functional dependence but not formal functional dependence, Poscher’s 
analogy is illuminating. Just as a building that is unfit for a religious 
purpose (or any other substantive purpose) can still stand, so too a law that 
achieves poor substantive results (whether immoral or otherwise 
substantively wrong/ineffective) is still a law and regulates conduct in the 
way that the category of law does. In these cases, the building and the 
architect’s work belong to the category of architecture, as do the positive 
law and the lawmaker’s work. However, as I argued above, law has formal 
functional dependence upon the rule of law, which embeds a narrow slice 
of morality into the formal functional conditions of law. 
Formal functional dependence upon an otherwise external domain 
requires one field to abide by at least some knowledge from another 
field—knowledge that is contained in the conceptions of that other field. 
Poscher’s consideration of religion and architecture misses this type of 
dependence. The relationship between architecture and religion is 
analogous to law’s substantive functional dependence on, and formal 
functional independence from, non-ROL morality. However, the 
relationship between architecture and religion is not analogous to law’s 
formal functional dependence (and thus essential ontological dependence) 
on the rule of law. A different analogy is needed for this relationship and 
can be given by continuing with Poscher’s discussion of the architectural 
design of a religious building while also considering another discipline 
with which architecture has a relationship. 











2. Casting the Metals 
In addition to religion, engineering—in particular structural 
engineering—is a crucial domain with which architecture interacts.84 
Considering architecture’s relationship with engineering is helpful in 
illustrating the formal functional dependence that law has on morality 
through the rule of law and the way in which the Midas Theory operates 
under the aegis of the rule of law. Architecture’s formal function is 
dependent on engineering, meaning that engineering provides the 
necessary conditions for the accomplishment of the formal functions of 
architecture. Engineering provides standards (functional and related to 
ontological essence) that architects cannot completely ignore while still 
engaging in architecture. This is especially so for the aspects of 
engineering that are focused on the structural integrity of buildings. To 
adapt Fuller’s famous phrasing, structural engineering is an “internal 
engineering of architecture,” which persists in all contexts in which 
architecture is involved.85 
Structural engineering applies scientifically informed knowledge to the 
construction of structures and buildings, thereby identifying which 
building designs can be constructed (with current technology or even at 
all, given the laws of physics). Engineering identifies the requirements for 
constructing a durable building, which is, at the very least, a building that 
is not structurally undermined by its own flawed design. To satisfy 
architecture’s formal functional dependence on engineering, the 
architectural design of a building must abide by engineering conceptions 
 
 
 84.  My thanks to Amy Salyzyn for highlighting the extent to which designing and 
constructing a building involves the collaboration of a team of professionals from multiple disciplines 
working alongside one another. The way in which professionals interact in applying and pursing the 
exigencies of their disciplines is a topic well worth studying both in fields that focus on philosophies 
of professionalism and in legal philosophy itself. Such discussions can greatly expand the insights and 
application of the Midas theory. Fuller himself considered the importance of philosophically studying 
the actual practitioners of law. See FULLER, supra note 43, at 285–291. David Luban has written rich 
works drawing on the spirit of Fuller’s early insights about having a philosophy of the professionals 
who work in the field of law. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); David 
Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801 (1998). 
 85.  This analogy runs in parallel in many ways to the analogy that Fuller makes between the 
rule of law and “the natural laws of carpentry, or at least those laws respected by a carpenter who 
wants the house he builds to remain standing and serve the purpose of those who live in it,” FULLER, 
supra note 8, at 96. Fuller describes these types of laws as “lower laws” that “do not exhaust the whole 
of man’s moral life.” Id. The aspects of morality that might be described as the “higher laws” are not 
as foundational to the ontology of law, though they deal with broader aspects of the moral life of an 
individual. This higher aspect of morality is what Fuller describes as “the external morality of law,” 
and which I would classify as relating to the substantive function of law. I would like to thank Kristen 












of concepts such as strength and stress (e.g., tensile strength and tensile 
stress), which are informed by scientific knowledge and conceptions.  
A “building” that is not designed and constructed in abidance with 
engineering requirements (especially a “building” that completely departs 
from engineering requirements) is not suited to be occupied because it 
lacks durability, or may have never been a standing structure at all. This 
failure to meet the requirements of another domain of knowledge 
undermines the “building’s” ability to perform its own formal function as 
an architectural product (i.e., to work as the thing that it is, and in the way 
that architectural products must function in order to belong to the field of 
architecture).86 Many, if not all, substantive functions fulfilled by 
architecture cannot be served by this “building,” depending on the extent 
of its departure from engineering requirements. A building must be 
capable of standing before it can be used as a mosque, school, museum, or 
for any other substantive purpose. There is knowledge—contained in 
conceptions in engineering—that provides internal formal standards of 
architecture that determine membership in the ontological category of 
architecture. 
Fuller’s account of the relationship between law and the rule of law is 
analogous to the relationship between architecture and the basic structural 
engineering requirements for buildings. The rule of law (a slice of 
morality that centers on respect for individual autonomy) is a precondition 
for law, as standards in engineering are preconditions for architecture. 
Thus, conditions that belong ontologically to another field of knowledge—
morality—are required to achieve the formal functions of law and to have 
the essence of law. Purported “legal systems” or “laws” must abide by the 
rule of law to perform their own formal function (i.e., to work as the 
ontological type of thing that they purport to be). 
“Legal systems” and “laws” that fail to abide by the moral norms of the 
rule of law (upon which law has formal functional dependence) are 
 
 
 86.  Of course, this will be true to a greater or lesser degree depending on the extent of the 
departure from engineering standards. Design flaws in a building, for example, may not be noticed 
right away and may not impede the immediate use of the building, even if these hidden dangers later 
make the building unfit for use. Indeed, some people (or even many people) may be able to use the 
building until the danger is actualized. Even so, the danger caused by the unsafe conditions will be 
present. It is this danger that can be taken to make the building unfit to inhabit and unable to play its 
role in the formal function of architecture. A building that completely fails to meet engineering 
standards will fail even at standing, and thus at the formal function of architecture. Similarly, 
departures from the rule of law and the ontological implications of these departures, are understood as 
matters of degree by Fuller. A “legal system” or “law” that completely departs from the rule of law 
will completely fail to belong to the category of law. A “legal system” or “law” that departs to some 
lesser degree from the rule of law will lose some of its formal legal excellence, perhaps even coming 
to only “half exist.” See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 











comparable, in terms of formal function, to the architectural design of a 
“building” that fails to abide by basic engineering principles about 
structures. Just as a “building” that is not constructed in abidance of 
engineering principles will not stand (will not perform architecture’s 
formal function), a “legal system” that deviates so profoundly from the 
rule of law that it fails to meet essential conditions of legal ontology is not 
actually a legal system. A particular “law” that deviates sufficiently from 
the rule of law is not actually a law at all. Such purported “legal systems” 
and “laws” that do not abide by the internal morality of law are 
functionally unable to subject human conduct to the governance of rules 
(are unable to perform the formal function of law).  
If lawmakers fail to follow non-ROL morality but do abide by the rule 
of law, the “laws” or “legal system” that they make may be morally, 
socially, religiously, and substantively dysfunctional and people may balk 
at following such “laws.” However, the “laws” will still be able to perform 
the formal function of subjecting human conduct to guidance by rules. The 
substantive function of law in any domain that law regulates benefits from, 
and sometimes depends on, lawmakers creating positive law that is in 
coherence with knowledge from other disciplines, including non-ROL 
morality, but the formal function of law does not depend on the 
lawmaker’s abidance of knowledge and conceptions from non-ROL 
morality or other domains. The lawmaker who departs from non-ROL 
morality but abides by the rule of law still produces something that 
properly belongs to the ontological domain of law, even if the particular 
“laws,” subject areas of law, or “legal systems” cannot serve their intended 
substantive function. 
Applying this Article’s Fullerian analysis to Poscher’s example of 
religious architecture extends our understanding of the interactions 
between conceptions in different fields of knowledge beyond Poscher’s 
discussion of what I have called substantive function. Drawing together 
points from sections II.B and II.C, it can be seen that the relationship 
between engineering, architecture, and religion is analogous to the 
relationship between the rule of law, law, and other domains (or parts of 
domains) with which law interacts (including non-ROL morality). If an 
endeavor within a domain that has substantive functional dependence upon 
another domain fails to meet the substantive functional requirements that 
are determined by that other domain (whether in non-ROL morality, 
sacred architecture, or elsewhere) the endeavor can fail in the achievement 
of its substantive aims. This substantive failure can take place even as the 












thereby continuing to retain membership in its own ontological category.87 
In contrast, formal function sets a specific kind of ontological standard 
that determines the essence (the kind) of an endeavor. A thing cannot fail 
in the formal function of a category and still belong to that category. 
The question of whether a conception even belongs to the category of 
law, a categorization for which the rule of law is a necessary condition, is 
ontologically prior to law’s substantive functional independence from 
morality, or from any other field of knowledge. If this is the case, then the 
Midas Theory cannot stand alone. Indeed, no theory of law that depends 
on law’s ability to perform its formal function can overcome the 
ontological priority of the rule of law. The Midas Theory must be alloyed 
to recognize law’s internal morality.  
D. Quenching, and Assaying the Composition of, the Alloy 
The implications that alloying the Midas Theory has for law’s 
interaction with other domains of knowledge, and for the pursuit of its 
own substantive function (especially via the development of legal 
conceptions of shared concepts), are both broad and narrow in different 
respects. The narrowness and breadth can be taken as different strengths of 
the alloyed theory. The implications are broad because “legal systems” 
and “laws” must always abide by the internal morality of law, including in 
performing the Midas function of law. No Midas function can be 
performed by “legal systems” and “laws” without membership in the 
ontological category of law (for which the internal morality of law 
provides necessary conditions). However, the implications are narrow in 
that Fuller’s functionalist legal theory allows law wide latitude in 
determining and pursuing law’s substantive functions once the necessary 
formal functional conditions for membership in the ontological category of 
law have been met. 
Addressing breadth, the internal morality of law is ontologically prior 
to law’s Midas function. The internal morality of law comes into play 
when law interacts with non-ROL morality and when law interacts with 
 
 
 87.  A failure to achieve the formal function(s) of a domain may also have implications for 
the achievement of the substantive functions of that same domain. Failing to abide by the requirements 
of one field of knowledge, such as engineering, may undermine the ability of an architect to achieve 
the formal and substantive functions of his/her own domain of knowledge—architecture—and the 
substantive function of another field of knowledge—religion—with which architecture is interacting. 
Consider the case of a building that is so structurally unsafe that it cannot perform its formal function; 
unsafe buildings should not, or cannot, be occupied at all. This failure to perform the formal function 
of architecture also implies a failure to perform the substantive functions of providing architectural 
products and services in a way that meets the substantive goal of designing a religious building or for 
accomplishing any structure-related substantive function of architecture. 











any other field. This includes fields that have well-recognized, and much 
debated, relationships with law (e.g., religion and politics) as well as fields 
that have less studied relationships with law (e.g., biology, mathematics, 
meteorology, etc.). This breadth exists not because the internal morality of 
law is particularly concerned with the substance of any field, but because 
the internal morality of law is concerned with all of law’s movements, and 
therefore also has a formal concern about the way that law interacts with 
fields other than non-ROL morality. The rule of law requires that “legal 
systems” and “laws” interact with other domains of knowledge, and 
pursue law’s substantive functions, in ways that abide by the ontological 
requirements of the category of law. The Midas Theory is thus always 
bound by law’s internal morality. 
Respecting narrowness, only portions of morality that are relevant to 
law’s ability to guide conduct are part of the rule of law. Law’s internal 
morality identifies a limited set of moral conditions that are prior to law’s 
Midas function, determining what is proper to the ontological category of 
law. These limited conditions shape law’s interactions with other domains 
of knowledge (or parts of other domains of knowledge, including non-
ROL morality), and law’s pursuit of its own substantive function. The rule 
of law is consistent with, and perhaps even aspirational towards, the 
pursuit of a broad range of substantive goals from various fields with 
which law interacts, including non-ROL moral goals such as the 
advancement of freedom, equality, and other substantive moral 
values/norms.88 However, the rule of law does not itself contain those 
broad ranges of goals or have a necessary connection with the vast 
majority of these goals in most contexts.89 “Legal systems” and “laws” do 
not necessarily have to pursue these broader aims in order to satisfy the 
formal functional conditions that the rule of law sets for belonging to the 
category of law. The rule of law is thus far from being a functional 
straitjacket or set of handcuffs for law’s Midas touch. 
Consider the following illustration of the statements just made. The 
internal morality of law is relevant to law’s interaction with meteorology 
and law’s Midas function as law develops a legal conception of the shared 
concept of fog. The central concern that the internal morality of law raises 
about the way in which law interacts with meteorology when it comes to 
the concept of fog is limited to ensuring that law does not deviate from the 
 
 
 88.  See generally FULLER, supra note 8, for Fuller’s exploration of the substantive aims of 
law, many of which are moral. 
 89.  Recall the observation give above that, in some instances, Fuller has overconfidently 
discussed the extent to which legal systems that abide by the rule of law will be consistent with non-












moral conditions that allow law to perform its formal function as it 
regulates human behavior in relation to fog. Accordingly, a “law” about 
driving in fog that fails to meet some minimal standard of clarity, or that 
requires drivers to perform an impossible task, will raise rule of law issues 
and perhaps fall outside of the ontological category of law.  
Conversely, a “law” about driving in fog that meets Fuller’s eight 
desiderata but imposes a minimal standard of care for driving in fog, 
allowing drivers to easily avoid tort liability—or even a law about driving 
in fog that meets Fuller’s desiderata but that is based on a faulty 
understanding of meteorology—does not violate the internal morality of 
law. These “laws” would likely fail, or perform poorly, at pursuing law’s 
substantive function of coordinating safe driving. By failing to coordinate 
safe driving, such “laws” may pose problems for non-ROL moral 
substantive functions or substantive functions outside of morality (e.g., in 
healthcare and the economics of roadways). Even so, these substantively 
flawed “laws” can be consistent with law’s formal function, and belong to 
the ontological category of law, if they abide by the rule of law.90 The rule 
of law is not engaged by the question of whether the “law” helps drivers 
safely navigate through fog. Rather, the rule of law is concerned with the 
question of whether drivers91 can navigate the “laws” about driving 
through fog. 
As noted earlier in this section, this narrowly tailored dynamic applies 
to law’s relationship with non-ROL morality as well, and to law’s pursuit 
of its substantive function in its interaction with non-ROL morality. The 
rule of law requires that law abide by Fuller’s desiderata when interacting 
with non-ROL morality, but not that law ensure: that society is more just 
and more equal (as determined by moral conceptions); that any other 
moral conceptions are advanced that do not have the rule of law’s specific 
formal functional implications for law; or that the substance of law is 
based on prevailing viewpoints about non-ROL morality. Law is left free 
in its formal functional requirements to create conceptions that deviate 
from the conceptions of non-ROL morality. Even as the rule of law has 
functional and ontological priority over law’s Midas capacities, it leaves 
substantial leeway for the Midas Theory to operate because the aspect of 
the rule of law that gives it ontological priority over the Midas Theory 
(i.e., the essential ontological dependence of law on the rule of law) does 
not address law’s substantive aims. The rule of law is a foundational but 
narrow formal functional condition for the essence of law. Law’s internal 
 
 
 90.  Recall also the illustration that I explored earlier, but in less detail, about the possibility 
of failing to achieve substantive function using price controls, supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 91.  And anyone else who interacts with laws that govern driving through fog. 











morality thus leaves a wide terrain for the Midas Theory to operate with 
respect to law’s substantive function. 
The Fullerian analysis offered here in response to the Midas Theory—a 
response largely given from a favorable reading of Poscher’s articulation 
of the theory—allows law to engage with other domains of knowledge 
(even with non-ROL morality) mostly in line with the way that Poscher 
describes. The internal morality of law would do little, if anything, to 
prevent the Midas Theory from dissolving the debate between inclusive 
legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism because law’s internal 
morality is concerned with law’s formal function and thus not with law’s 
Midas effect when law interacts with non-ROL morality (non-ROL 
morality pertaining to law’s substantive function). Fullerian legal theory 
allows for law to deviate in its substantive function from non-ROL moral 
conceptions, and from conceptions in any other domain of knowledge. 
However, a Midas Theory of Law that is alloyed with Fullerian procedural 
naturalism would spotlight the rule of law requirements (which are both 
formal and moral) that govern the ontology of law, the way in which law 
functions, and law’s engagement with morality, or any other field of 
knowledge. 
CONCLUSION  
The Midas Theory provides a sophisticated and parsimonious account 
of law’s relationship with other domains of knowledge. Without relying on 
arguments from political and moral philosophy, Poscher’s account of the 
Midas Theory shows the ability of law to take stock of conceptions from 
other domains without law depending ontologically (even contingently) on 
another domain of knowledge. The extent to which Poscher deals with 
questions about the relationship between law and morality through a 
merely descriptive approach is exceptional even among positivists. 
Despite these strengths, the Midas Theory misses a key aspect of the 
relationship between law and morality: the necessary functional 
connection between these two domains via the rule of law (i.e., via law’s 
formal function of guiding conduct using rules). This connection precludes 
the ontological independence of law from morality that Midas theorists 
like Poscher propose. The Fullerian theory of law is prior to, and thus 
shapes, the way in which law can aurify conceptions from other domains 
of knowledge. The Midas Theory and Fullerian functionalism are not 
natural allies but the theories can make room for one another. They can 
thereby achieve a richer theoretical description of law, due to their 
conceptual frugality and explanations of law’s function. 
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